Declaratory Relief, Criminal Statutes

The Declaratory Judgment Act is “liberally construed.” Committee for Educ. Equality v. State, 878 S.W.2d 446, 462 (Mo. 1994). A “[d]eclaratory judgment is sui generis, and is neither legal nor equitable.” Smith v. Smith, 623 S.W.3d 662, 677 (Mo. Ct. App. 2021). It is, however, analyzed and treated as an equitable remedy. State ex rel. Leonardi v. Sherry, 137 S.W.3d 462, 471 (Mo. 2004); see State ex rel. SLAH, LLC v. City of Woodson Terrace, 378 S.W.3d 357, 361 (Mo. 2012) (“because their historical affinity is equitable, equitable principles govern such actions”). With that in mind, a Court may be “guided by the equitable principles of fairness and justice.” Robinson v. Langenbach, 599 S.W.3d 167, 188 (Mo. 2020).

There are four elements: (1) a justiciable controversy that presents a real, substantial, presently-existing controversy admitting of specific relief, as distinguished from an advisory decree upon a purely hypothetical situation; (2) a plaintiff with a legally protectable interest at
stake; (3) a controversy ripe for judicial determination; and (4) an inadequate remedy at law. Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists, Inc. v. Bd. of Reg., 343 S.W.3d 348, 354 (Mo. 2011).

In spite of the broad language used in discussing declaratory reliefs, it certainly has its limits. Generally, Missouri courts lack authority to enter a declaratory judgment or order injunctive relief that interferes with the enforcement of criminal statutes. See State ex rel. Eagleton v. McQueen, 378 S.W.2d 449, 453 (Mo. 1964) (“Generally a court of equity is without jurisdiction to interfere with the enforcement of the criminal law.”)